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A Trial Judge May Not Impose a Sentence Greater than the 
Outlined Punishment of an Accepted Plea Agreement, even 
when the Added Condition Immediately Follows the 
Defendant's Acceptance 
By: James Hanratty 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a trial judge's 
imposition of a sentence greater than one already accepted in a plea 
agreement is an illegal sentence. Tweedy v. State, 380 Md. 475, 845 
A.2d 1215 (2004). A trial judge is, therefore, prohibited from adding 
any additional conditions to a plea agreement after a defendant has 
assented to the terms of the deal, even if the judge's added conditions 
immediately follow a defendant's consent. ld. 
Millard Tweedy ("Tweedy") was indicted by a Baltimore City 
Grand Jury on several narcotics charges, including possession with 
the intent to distribute. Subsequent to the indictment, Tweedy 
appeared in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and entered a guilty 
plea for possession with the intent to distribute. Tweedy's counsel 
advised him of the terms of the plea, specifically, that in exchange for 
his guilty plea, Tweedy's sentence would be limited to five years with 
all but six months suspended. As an additional provision, Tweedy's 
sentence would be further reduced if he agreed to perform certain 
remedial activities prior to the sentencing date. Tweedy verbally 
agreed to the above-stated terms. Thereafter, the trial judge ruled, if 
Tweedy failed to appear for sentencing, his sentence would be 
increased to the full five-year term. Tweedy failed to appear for 
sentencing and the trial judge entered a sentence of five years. 
Tweedy filed a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence and 
requested that, pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, the five-
year sentence be suspended except for six months. The trial judge 
denied Tweedy's motion without a hearing. Thereafter, Tweedy filed 
a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which 
upheld the trial court's decision in an unreported opinion. The Court 
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of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to consider whether a trial 
judge may impose a sentence greater than that outlined in an 
accepted plea agreement. 
The court of appeals began its analysis by comparing plea 
agreements to contracts, noting that neither may be "unilaterally 
broken with impunity or without consequence." Id. at 482, 845 A.2d at 
1219. The court explained that plea agreements are commonly 
accepted procedures throughout the country, which have been 
recognized by the Maryland General Assembly by way of Maryland 
Rule 4-243(c). Id. at 484-85,845 A.2d at 1220-21. This Rule states, "the 
judge shall embody in the judgment the agreed sentence, disposition, 
or other judicial action encompassed in the agreement." Id. 
Tweedy contended that he accepted the plea agreement before 
the trial judge supplemented it with the added requirement of 
Tweedy's presence. Id. at 483, 845 A.2d at 1219-20. By contrast, the 
State argued, the plea had not yet been accepted by the court; 
therefore, the trial judge was free to compel Tweedy's presence at 
sentencing as an additional condition of the agreement. [d. The State 
further argued that Tweedy's failure to object to the added term 
operated as an implied consent. [d. 
The court of appeals focused on the chronology of the trial 
procedures to establish when the plea agreement was accepted. Id. at 
486, 845 A.2d at 1221. The court found Tweedy assented to the terms 
of the agreement, the court accepted the plea agreement, and the trial 
judge advised Tweedy of the consequences of his failure to appear at 
sentencing. [d. Thus, the additional increased punishment occurred 
after the plea was accepted and was, therefore, illegaL [d. (Emphasis 
added). In this regard, the court of appeals recognized that conditions 
requiring appearance at sentencing are valid if the plea agreement is 
presented to the defendant and the plea agreement is accepted. Id. at 
486-87, 845 A.2d at 1221-22. 
Upon this finding, the court of appeals granted Tweedy's 
request that the original plea agreement be specifically performed. Id. 
at 489, 845 A.2d at 1223. The court stated, "it is well settled that 
where the defendant has not received the benefit of a plea bargain to 
which he is entitled, the defendant may elect to have the bargain 
specifically enforced or withdraw the guilty plea." Id. ~t 488, 845 A.2d 
at 1222. Moreover, even though the present case involved a court's 
90 
failure, not a prosecutor's failure, to uphold a plea agreement, the 
defendant's options remained the same. Id. at 489,845 A.2d at 1223. 
As an additional matter, in dicta, the court expressed its 
concern over the trial court's decision to continue with sentencing 
despite Tweedy's absence. Id. at 498, 845 A.2d at 1228. The court 
explained that sentencing in absentia is contrary to a criminal 
defendant's right to be present at every stage of their trial. Id. at 490, 
845 A.2d at 1225. The court of appeals also stated that sentencing in 
absentia deprives a defendant of the opportunity to explain his/her 
absence, thereby limiting the evidence gathering function of the trial 
court. Id. at 490, 845 A.2d at 1224. The court utilized the test 
established in Pickney v. State, 350 Md. 201, 711 A.2d 205 (1998), for 
when a defendant can waive his/her right to be present. [d. at 493, 845 
A.2d at 1226. The test requires that the defendant know of the time 
and place of the proceeding, and that nonappearance be knowing and 
deliberate. Id. at 493, 845 A.2d at 1226. The court must then balance 
the interests of efficient criminal justice against the rights of the 
defendant. Id. The court of appeals found that only in "extraordinary 
cases" after analyzing all of the "relevant circumstances" should in 
absentia proceedings be permitted. Id. The trial court's failure to 
investigate the reasons for Tweedy's absence and the court's refusal to 
employ alternative methods to compel his appearance were 
particularly troublesome for the court of appeals. Id. at 498-99, 845 
A.2d at 1228-29. 
The concurrence by Judge Harrell centered on the issue of in 
absentia sentencing and questioned the methodology the majority 
employed to invalidate Tweedy's sentence. Id. at 500-01,845 A.2d at 
1229-30. The concurrence shared the majority's disfavor of in absentia 
criminal proceedings, but favored a holistic view of plea acceptances, 
rather than the majority's concentration on a "particular part" of the 
plea procedure. Id. 
In Tweedy v. State, the court of appeals' view of when a plea is 
accepted is based on a rigid, compartmentalized analysis of criminal 
proceedings. The court of appeals has established a protocol which 
requires that all terms of a plea agreement be stated before the 
defendant accepts the offer. This standard will theoretically protect 
defendants from harsher sentences after they have pled guilty, but the 
practical effects of this decision may lead to an overemphasis on 
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procedure. If a judge inadvertently forgets to add a term to the 
agreement before the defendant accepts, the omitted term is 
eliminated. This standard may prove to be too onerous for trial 
judges, who are often faced with large dockets and hectic timetables. 
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